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Boris	 Yeltsin	 and	Mikhail	 Gorbachev.	 It	 has	 re-emerged	 regularly	 as	
a	general	political	slogan,	and	was	conceptually	developed	only	in	2010.	
However,	it	has	never	been	recast	into	a	detailed	political	programme.	
It	 surfaced	 in	periods	of	 rising	political	dynamics	 in	 the	 relations	be-
tween	 the	West	 and	 Russia,	which	 either	 offered	 hope	 that	Moscow’s	
proposals	 could	 become	 reality,	 or	 created	 a	 perception	 that	 Russia’s	







By	 signing	 agreements	 and	 establishing	 joint	 institutions,	 the	 two	 blocs	
would	form	a	partly	integrated	area	of	security,	economic	and	energy	co-
operation,	 and	human	contacts.	However,	 the	 formation	of	 such	an	area	
would	not	lead	to	Russia	and	its	neighbours	gradually	adopting	European	



























Greater	 Europe	 concept	 would	 in	 practice	 permanently	 split	 Europe	
into	two	geopolitical	blocs.











efficacy	 in	pursuing	 the	project.	Russia,	 it	 seems,	has	overestimated	 its	
own	attractiveness	and	the	willingness	of	its	European	partners	to	make	
concessions	with	regard	to	the	future	shape	of	Europe’s	security	and	eco-

























regularly	referring	to	Greater	Europe	(Большая Европа in Russian).	The	phrase	
has	been	used	 in	various	meanings.	 It	was	employed,	especially	 in	 the	early	
2000s,	by	those	Russian	experts	who	advocated	closer	co-operation	between	
































I. GREATER EUROPE: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION  
OF THE CONCEPT
1. Mikhail Gorbachev’s idea of a “Common European Home”  
(late 1980s)




























2	 For	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 Gorbachev’s	 concept,	 see:	 Eugene	 B.	 Rumer,	 The	
German	Question	 in	Moscow’s	 “Common	European	Home”:	A	Background	 to	 the	Revolu-













Some	 of	 the	 Soviet	 proposals	were	 gradually	 put	 into	 practice,	 e.g.	 the	 CFE	
Treaty	on	the	reduction	of	conventional	 forces	 in	Europe	and	the	Charter	of	






2. Boris Yeltsin’s Greater Europe (1997)
In	the	new	(geo)political	conditions,	the	Russian	Federation	in	fact	took	over	
some	 of	 the	 Soviet	 projects,	 in	 changed	 form,	 and	 concentrated	 its	 efforts	

















“We are now poised to begin building together a new greater Europe without di-
viding lines; a Europe in which no single state will be able to impose its will on any 
other; a Europe in which large and small countries will be equal partners united 
by common democratic principles.
This Greater Europe can now become a powerful community of nations 













ability to ensure its own security. It can draw on the experience of the cultur-
al, national and historical legacies of all of Europe’s peoples. The road to greater 
Europe is a long and hard one but it is in the interest of all Europeans to take it. 
Russia will also help to realise this goal.”3
Some	key	thoughts	can	be	distilled	from	this	emphatic	statement.	Firstly,	Rus-
sia	should	be	an	equal	member	of	the	emerging	new	community	of	European	
states.	Secondly,	 that	 community	 should	be	powerful	 and	 independent,	 also	
in	terms	of	security.	Such	independence	would	have	to	imply	ending	Europe’s	
dependence	 on	 co-operation,	 and	 especially	 on	 security	 co-operation,	 with	
the	United	States,	and	working	more	closely	together	with	Russia	in	different	
spheres.	And	this,	it	seems,	was	the	subtext	of	this	initiative.
3. Vladimir Putin’s Greater Europe (2001, 2005)
Greater	Europe	re-emerged	as	a	trope	in	the	Russian	leadership's	rhetoric	four	
years	later.	It	happened	in	special	circumstances:	when	the	Western	world	was	
shaken	by	 the	 terror	attacks	 in	New	York	and	Washington	on	 11	September	
2001,	and	a	global	anti-terror	coalition	led	by	the	United	States	was	forming,	
to	which	Russia	also	offered	partial	backing.	At	that	point	Russia	seemed	to	be	






























“It is my firm conviction that in today's rapidly changing world, in a world wit-
nessing truly dramatic demographic changes and an exceptionally high economic 
growth in some regions, Europe also has an immediate interest in promoting rela-
tions with Russia. No one calls in question the great value of Europe's rela-
tions with the United States. I am just of the opinion that Europe will re-
inforce its reputation of a strong and truly independent centre of world 
politics soundly and for a long time if it succeeds in bringing together its 
own potential and that of Russia, including its human, territorial and 
natural resources and its economic, cultural and defence potential.”6
The	statement	in	a	way	reiterated	and	elaborated	on	Yeltsin’s	idea.	The	differ-
ence	 lay	 in	 the	 fact	 that	Putin	 left	aside	 the	 liberal	and	democratic	rhetoric,	
and	pointed	to	national	interests	instead.	He	stressed	what	he	believed	were	










Indeed,	 Putin	 used	 the	 same	 rhetoric	 when	 addressing	 a	 French	 audience.	
In	May	2005	he	placed	an	op-ed	in	the	Le Figaro	daily.	The	context	of	the	pub-
lication	 is	 important.	 Several	 months	 before,	 Ukraine	 had	 undergone	 the	




























“I am deeply convinced: united Greater Europe from the Atlantic to the 
Urals, and in fact all the way to the Pacific Ocean, the existence of which will 
be based on universally recognised democratic principles, offers a unique chance 
for all the nations of the continent, including the Russian nation. Europeans can 
fully rely on Russia in the pursuit of this chance for a peaceful, prosperous and 
dignified future, as they could in the struggle against Nazism. We also believe 
that Russia’s efforts to develop integration bonds with both the EU mem-
ber states and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
are a single, organic process which should lead to a considerable expan-
sion of harmonious common spaces of security, democracy and business 
co-operation in this gigantic region.”8







European	 integration.	That	 thought	had	already	been	raised	before	 in	state-
ments	by	high-ranking	Russian	officials	(see	below).
7	 For	 the	 full	 text	 of	 the	 four	 roadmaps,	 see:	 http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/roadmap_
economic_en.pdf	
8	 Статья Пре зи дента Российской Федерации В.В.Путина “Уроки победы над нацизмом: 
Через осмыс ление прошлого – к совместному строительству безопасного гуманного 
















4.  Putin’s concept of Greater Europe takes shape (2010–2012)





financial	 and	 economic	 crisis	 like	 the	 one	 in	 2008-2009,	which	 had	 also	




the	most	 important	 issue	of	 the	day,	and	since	Putin	was	at	 that	 time	the	
prime	minister	of	Russia	(in	charge	of	economic	policy),	the	article	focused	
on	the	economy.
Referring	 to	 the	 shared	 experience	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 in	 Russia	
among	other	themes,	Putin	wrote:
“Europe needs its own vision of the future. We propose to shape it togeth-
er, through a Russia-EU partnership. It would be our joint bid for success 
and competitiveness in the modern world. (…) To alter the situation, we 
should exploit the advantages and opportunities available to both 
Russia and the EU. This could be a truly organic synergy of two econ-
omies – a classic and established EU model, and Russia's developing 
and new economy, with growth factors that complement each other 
well. We have modern technology, natural resources and capital for 
investment. Above all, we have unique human potential. Finally, Rus-
sia and the EU have ample cooperation experience. And I am happy to say 
that Germany, the engine of European integration, is setting an example of 
leadership in this area.”9
9	 Россия и Европа: от осмысления уроков кризиса – к новой повестке партнерства,	ar-
ticle	 by	 Prime	 Minister	 Vladimir	 Putin	 in	 Süddeutsche Zeitung,	 25.11.2010,	 http://www.


























2. “A common industrial policy based on a synergy between the techno-






3. “A common energy complex in Europe” 
The	 complex	 would	 comprise	 extended	 energy	 infrastructure,	 the	 Nord	
Stream	and	South	Stream	gas	pipelines,	and	would	be	governed	by	new	reg-
ulations,	including	a	new	energy	treaty	proposed	by	Russia,	which	would	






4. Co-operation in science and education
















5. Elimination of barriers impeding human and business contacts
This	objective	would	be	achieved	by	abolishing	visas	for	travellers	between	
the	EU	and	Russia	based	on	a	clear	plan	and	definite	time	schedule.



















“The Eurasian Union will be built on universal integration principles as 
an essential part of Greater Europe, united by shared values of freedom, 
democracy and marketlaws. (…) Soon, the Customs Union, and later the 
Eurasian Union, will join the dialogue with the EU. As a result, apart from 
bringing direct economic benefits, accession to the Eurasian Union will also help 
countries integrate into Europe sooner and from a stronger position. In addi-
tion, a partnership between the Eurasian Union and EU that is economi-
cally consistent and balanced will prompt changes in the geopolitical and 
geoeconomic setup of the continent as a whole with a guaranteed global 
effect.	(…) For example, take the two largest associations of our continent – the 
European Union and the Eurasian Union, currently under construction. In build-
ing cooperation on the principles of free trade rules and compatible regulation 













third parties and regional institutions, all the way from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
Oceans. They will thus create an area that will be economically harmonised, but 














gration	bloc.	The	emphasis	on	 this	aspect	 seems	 to	have	been	related	 to	 the	
concerns	raised	in	the	Kremlin	by	the	revolutions	in	Arab	states,	which	started	
breaking	out	in	early	2011,	and	which	Putin	and	his	inner	circle	regarded	as	yet	
another	attempt	at	Washington-instigated	“export	of	democracy”,	 i.e.	 in	 fact	
a	manifestation	of	the	geopolitical	expansionism	of	the	United	States11.







10	 Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается сегодня.	
article	 by	 Prime	 Minister	 Vladimir	 Putin	 in	 Izvestia,	 4October	 2011,	 http://izvestia.ru/
news/502761	




























Sergei	Karaganov13)	was	designed,	inter alia,	to	strengthen Russia’s capabili-
ties and position in its economic turn towards the “new Asia”.	Given	that	
the	article	juxtaposed	two	contrasting	images:	the	crisis-stricken	Europe	and	




13	 Cf. К Cоюзу Европы. Аналитический доклад российской группы международного дис­
куссионного клуба «Валдай»,	 31	 August	 -	 7	 September	 2010,	 http://www.svop.ru/files/

















II. GREATER EUROPE: ATTEMPTS AT PUTTING  
THE CONCEPT INTO PRACTICE
The	general	ideas	present	in	the	rhetoric	of	Russian	leaders	who	spoke	about	
Greater	Europe	were	not	detached	from	Russia’s	foreign	policy	practice	in	Eu-
rope.	 Russian	 diplomacy	 formulated	 and	 tried	 to	 implement	 initiatives	 that	
were	in	line	with	the	Greater	Europe	concept.
1. The Russia-Germany-France Triangle: Greater Europe’s core that 





















































2.1. The security space









15	 The	meetings	 took	place	 on	 11	April	 2003	 in	St.	 Petersburg	 (Putin,	 Schröder,	Chirac),	 on	





























publicly	presented	its	draft	Treaty on European Security19.
Russia’s draft Treaty on European Security
The	draft	is	a	fairly	short	and	general	document	comprising	fourteen	ar-
ticles.	It	commits	all	parties	(potentially,	the	countries	of	North	America,	


































































































operation	on	 this	 issues),	which	never	happened,	and	 therefore	 the	chances	
that	the	initiative	will	become	reality	at	some	point	are	slim.
2.2. The economic and energy space














































Russia’s accession to the WTO	was	a	key	element	and	a	precondition	of	the	

















































took	 part	within	 the	 framework	 of	 a	 project	 implemented	 under	 the	 TACIS	
programme,	and	after	2010	–	within	the	framework	of	projects	implemented	
under	 the	auspices	of	 the	Partnership	 for	Modernisation	 (see	below)27. Even	






25	 Such	 an	 understanding	 was	 suggested	 already	 in	 the	 EU-Russia	 Partnership	 and	 Co-










27	 The	 project	 "Approximation	 of	 EU	 and	 Russian	 Federation	 technical	 regulation,	 stand-
ardisation	 and	 certification	 systems"	worth	 €	 2.5	million,	 implemented	 between	August	
2009	and	December	2011.	See:	http://eu-rf.org/	In	May	2013,	two	new	projects	were	inau-






See:the	 EU-Russia	 Common	 Spaces	 Progress	 Report	 2012,	 op.cit.	 Cf.	 EU-Russia	 Common	















The Energy Dialogue between Russia and the EU became	formalised	in	Oc-
tober	2000.	 It	produced	a	number	of	agreements	and	arrangement,	many	of	
which	were	beneficial	for	Russia.	They	concerned,	among	other	issues,	support	










the	 absence	 of	 provisions	 imposing	heavier	 obligations	 on	 the	 transit	 coun-
tries,	which	Russia	had	called	for.
Shortly	before,	in	April	2009,	Russia	presented	its	own	draft	outline	of	the	pro-
jected	new	agreement.	The	document,	titled	Concept of a new legal basis for inter-
national energy co-operation (objectives and principles),	repeated	a	number	of	ECT	
provisions,	but	put	more	emphasis	on	respecting	the	interests	of	the	energy-
producing	countries	and	the	principle	of	“security	of	demand”30.
Russia’s proposals for a new Energy Charter
The	 short,	 five-page	 document	 consisted	 of	 the	 principal	 text	 outlining	
the	objectives	and	guiding	principles	of	the	new	agreement,	and	two	an-
nexes:	a	draft	of	new	provisions	concerning	transit	guarantees,	and	a	list	
of	 energy	 resources	 and	 products.	 Russia’s	main	 declared	 objective	was	







30	 The	 document	 was	 delivered	 to	 the	 European	 Commission,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 G8,	 G20	 and	

















energy	markets	 and	 technologies,	 support	 for	 asset	 swaps	 and	 research	
and	 technology	 co-operation,	 protection	 of	 investments	 and	 infrastruc-
ture,	 and	 the	 obligation	 to	 consult	 and	 co-ordinate	 energy	 policies	 and	








particular	 to	Moscow's	conflicts	with	Ukraine	over	 the	 terms	and	condi-
tions	of	supplies	and	transit	of	natural	gas.	If	adopted	in	the	form	proposed	
by	Russia,	 the	 treaty	would	create	an	asymmetry	 in	 favour	of	Russia.	 In	
practice	it	would	considerably	undermine	the	position	of	the	transit	states,	





The	 EU	 side	 took	 note	 of	 Russia’s	 proposals	 and	 discussed	 them	within	 the	
framework	of	the	energy	dialogue,	but	the	differences	between	the	two	sides	




































plementing	multilateral co-operation projects, especially in the energy 
sector.	The	most	notable	examples	 included	 the	construction,	by	a	Russian-
German-French-Dutch	 consortium	with	Gazprom	 in	 the	 leading	 role,	 of	 the	
Nord	Stream	gas	pipeline	under	the	Baltic	Sea	bed	from	Russia	 to	Germany,	
and	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 Russian-Italian-French	 consortium	 led	 by	Gazprom	 to	
build	the	South	Stream	gas	pipeline	under	the	bottom	of	the	Black	Sea,	to	ex-
port	Russian	gas	mainly	to	the	Balkan	states	and	Italy34.
As	far	as	other,	energy-unrelated areas of economic dialogue and co-opera-
tion are	concerned,	the	Russian	side	has	shown	some	interest	in	the	automobile	
32	 See:	Agata	Łoskot-Strachota,	Ewa	Paszyc,	Rosja-UE:	spór	o	unijny	rynek	gazu,	Tydzień	na	










28/	nord-and-south-stream-wont-save-gazprom;	 Ewa	 Paszyc,	 Russia:	 Gazprom	 has	 activated	
Nord	 Stream’s	 second	 pipeline,	 Eastweek,	 OSW,	 10.10.2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/eastweek/2012-10-10/russia-gazprom-has-activated-nord-stream-s-second-pipeline;	
Szymon	Kardaś,	Ewa	Paszyc,	At	any	price:	Russia	is	embarking	on	the	construction	of	South	


































In	 addition	 to	 the	 above,	Russian operators undertook or planned many	
other	initiatives in the EU market, aimed at acquiring or exchanging as-
sets, which	were	also	in	line	with	the	Greater	Europe	concept	as	formulated	by	
Vladimir	Putin	in	his	Süddeutsche Zeitung article37.
2.3. The sphere of human contacts







































visa-free	 travel	 should	remain	available	 to	 those	 traveling	 to	and	 from	the	
Kaliningrad	exclave.	This,	however,	would	have	been	against	the	EU	regula-














































alisation	of	 the	visa	regime	and	a	 list	of	 	 “common	steps”	 (in	 fact	conditions	














42	 Russia	made	 the	 signature	of	 the	agreement	on	 further	 liberalisation	of	 the	visa	 regime	





































































“Russia is interested in integration with its neighbours in the CIS and in 
developing relations with the European Union. These two are not alterna-
tive directions – they mutually complement each other: an alliance of post-
Soviet republics will be better positioned to develop relations with Europe. (…) It 
is obvious that creating an economic space will be beneficial for Russia both in 
the Eastern (the CIS) and the Western dimension (the EU). These two processes 
could progress in isolation, or on the contrary, they could be linked, and 
thus mutually enrich themselves and gradually consolidate a sphere of 
economic integration which, in terms of the size of its population, would 
be three times as big as Russia. We think that for us [Russia] the second 
variant is preferable and more realistic. Such is the conclusion from our re-
cent experience of consultations with our partners in the two formats – the Com-
mon Economic Space with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the Common 
European Economic Space (CEES). (…) Integration processes involving the 
CIS countries may progress faster than the formation of the CEES – our 
countries represent more similar levels of economic development and competition, 
and much has already been done for the mutual opening of markets, while our 
economic regulations are still being made and are therefore easier to harmonise. 
It is therefore all the more important to carefully consider some of the necessary 
measures, so that in future they can be applied in dialogue with the European Un-
ion. (…) The establishment of a single economic space with Russia and our 
neighbours in the East and the West is a long-term objective. Its individual 
inter-state elements may develop faster than others, depending on the real readi-
ness of each state to pursue deeper integration. An analogy to a ‘multi-speed Eu-
rope’ is quite justified here. (…) As this ‘trans-European space’ develops, its gravity 
will increase, attracting more and more CIS countries and our other neighbours. 
This will create a new quality of economic collaboration in the vast terri-






46	 Единое экономическое пространство: политические амбиции или экономическая целе­
сообразность? Статья заместителя Председателя Правительства России В.Б. Христ енко, 



























and	argue	 that	 the	very	 initiative	of	Greater	Europe	had	emerged	 in	part	as	
a	response	to	the	European	Union’s	rising	activity	in	the	eastern	neighbour-
hood,	which	Russia	perceived	as	a	challenge.
This	 reasoning	was	 visible	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 statements	made	 by	 the	 then	
Deputy	Foreign	Minister	of	Russia,	Vladimir	Chizhov,	made	during	the	course	
of	2004.	Chizhov	criticised,	sometimes	harshly,	the	developing	European	Neigh-
bourhood	Policy,	 even	 to	 the	point	of	accusing	 the	EU	of	attempts	at	building	









and	 Southern	Neighbours,	 Brussels’,	 11	March	 2003,	 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com03_104_en.pdf;	‘Council	Conclusions	on	Wider	Europe-New	Neighbourhood’,	Brussels	
16	June	2003,	http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/cc06_03.pdf
48	 Выступление заместителя министра иностранных дел России В. А. Чижова на кон­
ференции “Расширяющаяся Европа: новая повестка дня” по теме “Черноморское и ка­
вказское соседство Европы” Братислава, 19 марта,	19	March	2004,	http://www.mid.ru/
bdomp/dip_vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717c733c32567370042ee43/5cab9ebee9ab1fb1c3256e9b0033c
















III. CONCLUSIONS:  
GREATER EUROPE – HOW, WHY AND WHAT NExT?
1. The concept and the circumstances in which it was championed
By	 analysing	Russia’s	 declarations	 as	well	 as	 its	 actions,	 one	 can	 roughly	
reconstruct	the Russian idea of Greater Europe.	This	should	be	a	common	























but	 also	 the	 reactivation	 of	 the	 Russia-Germany-France	 triangle	 against	 the	
background	of	the	Iraq	war	in	2003–2005;	another	normalisation	of	Russia-West	





















The United States remains	the	main	point	of	reference	for	Russia.	The	Kremlin	
considers	the	US	as	a	declining	global	power,	but	one	which	nevertheless	still	









































other	 hand,	 bilateral	 energy,	 industrial	 and	 defence	 deals	 with	 Germany,	
France	and	Italy	were	supposed	to	constitute	the	very	network	of	relations	




to	 expand	 its	 economic	 presence	 in	 Europe,	 gain	wider	 access	 to	 EU	mar-
kets,	create	and	control	transnational	holdings	by	exchanging	business	as-
sets	with	EU	countries,	and	obtain	capital	&	high	technology	transfers	from	
the	 leading	 European	 countries.	 Interestingly,	 Moscow	 seemed	 to	 believe	











jor	challenge	 to	 it.	Russia	has	been	observing	 the	dynamic	rise	of	China's	
power	and	international	clout	with	some	concern,	and	has	opted	for	closer	
co-operation	with	Beijing	as	the	main	element	of	its	political	tactics.	At	the	
same	 time,	Russia	obsessively	 fears	attempts	by	 the	United	States	 to	 take	
advantage	of	the	tensions	and	clashes	of	interests	between	itself	and	China.	






colours	 the	 subtext	 of	 this	 initiative.	 Paradoxically,	 this	has	not	 changed	
even	with	Russia’s	‘turn	towards	Asia’,	which	Moscow	has	been	promoting	
particularly	 actively	 since	 2012,	 and	which	was	 in	part	 a	 response	 to	 the	
analogous	 policy	 of	 the	United	 States.	 That	 is	 because	 in	 seeking	 to	 play	
a	 greater	 role	 in	 the	Asia-Pacific	 region,	Russia	 intends	 to	 strengthen	 its	

















Russia	treats	the CIS area as	its	natural	sphere	of	influence,	one	of	the	fun-









policy	of	Russia	as	outlined	above;	but	 this	 is	not	 the	case,	at	 least	 in	view	































































As	 regards	energy,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 impression	 that	 not	 only	 is	 the	Rus-
sian-proposed	 single	 European	 energy	 space	 based	 on	 rules	 different	 from	

























an	 image-building	measure	 than	 any	 real	 decision-making	 centre.	Moscow	







of	Germany,	which	Moscow	hoped	would	be	 its	main	partner	 in	 the	 imple-
mentation	of	the	Greater	Europe	project.	Although	Berlin	has	always	been	at	
the	forefront	of	European	economic	and	energy	co-operation	with	Russia,	ten-
sions	and	differences	on	certain	 important	 issues	have	 increasingly	become	
apparent	 between	 the	 two	 sides,	 especially	 since	 2012.	While	 Germany	 has	
called	for	the	establishment	of	a	new	consultation	body	between	the	EU	and	







EU	energy	commissioner	Günther	Oettinger	 to	Ukraine	as	 it	defended	 itself	
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economic and social situation  
in russia, the Caucasus, Central 
asia, Central and Eastern Europe, 
germany and the Balkans.
osW was founded in 1990 and is 
fully financed from the state budget. 
in 2006 the Centre was named in 
honour of its founder Marek Karp. 
our studies are addressed mainly 
to state institutions including the 
Chancellery of the President of the 
republic of Poland, the Chancellery 
of the Prime Minister, ministries and 
government agencies, as well as the 
sejm and senate of the republic  
of Poland.
We are particularly active in 
discussions concerning the 
European union’s Eastern Policy, 
challenges to energy security,  
as well as the political, social and 
economic transformation processes 
in countries neighbouring Poland.
Many of our publications are 
available online at: osw.waw.pl
Publication series
point of View – short analytical studies 
presenting the opinions of our experts  
on current policy issues, published in Polish 
and in English.
oSW Studies – large analytical studies 
devoted to major political, social  
and economic processes taking place  
in osW’s area of interest; published in Polish 
and in English.
OSW newsletters
eaStWeeK – a weekly analytical newsletter 
on russia, ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus  
and Central asia (published in Polish  
as tydzień na Wschodzie).
CeWeeKLY (Central European Weekly) –  
a weekly analytical newsletter on the Baltic 
states, Central Europe, germany and the 
Balkans (published in Polish as BeSt oSW).
oSW Commentary – a series of more 
in-depth analyses concerning the most 
important events and developments in our 
area of interest (published in Polish  
as Komentarze oSW).
osW newsletters are available free of charge, 
subject to subscription
